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Identity Theft: Prevention and Liability

I. INTRODUCTION

Scott Clinton Gilbert incurred debts of more than $110,000.'
He purchased three .pickup trucks, two motorcycles, and a doublewide mobile home.' He was issued a driver's license, received a
speeding ticket, was involved in an automobile accident, obtained

employment, failed to pay taxes, opened bank accounts, and even
obtained an FAA security pass at the Phoenix International Airport. 3
He also filed a bankruptcy petition for $44,756.97, obtained four life
insurance policies, and claimed the status of a Vietnam veteran. 4 The
problem with Gilbert's actions is that he did all of this using the
identity of Robert Hartle.5 Hartle knew nothing of Gilbert's actions
until he received a phone call from a collection agency regarding an
unpaid bill in the amount of $185.30 from a Las Vegas printing shop. 6
Hartle spent time, energy, and approximately $15,000 of his own
money to clear his name and attempt to restore his good credit. 7
One survey indicates that one in four adults have been the
victim of some sort of identity theft. 8 In 1997, the United States
Secret Service alone made nearly 9,500 arrests for crimes involving
identity theft. 9 Those arrests involved crimes totaling $745 million in
losses that were incurred by financial institutions and individual
victims.' 0 Furthermore, losses from identity theft are increasing,

1. See Michael Higgins, Identity Thieves, A.B.A. J., October 1998, at 42.
2. See id.
3. See The Identity Theft and Assumption DeterrenceAct: Hearings on S. 512 Before
the Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism and Government Information of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 3 (1998) [hereinafter Identity Theft Hearings]

(statement of Robert Hartle).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See Higgins, supra note 1 at 42.

7.
8.
9.
10.

See Identity Theft Hearings, supra note 3, at 3 (statement of Robert Hartle).
See id. at 24 (statement of Mari J. Frank).
See id. at 1 (opening statement of Chairman Jon Kyl).
See id.
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nearly doubling in the last two years." The U.S. Public Interest
Research Group estimates that each year nearly 40,000 people are
victims of identity theft. 12
This Comment will first address the nature of identity theft and
explain how the identity thief acquires the necessary personal
information. 13 Next, the Comment will examine recent federal
legislation that makes identity theft a crime. 14 Lastly, the Comment
will discuss what efforts must be made to resolve the problems posed
by identity theft. 15 The Comment will address the role that financial
institutions can play in combating the problem 16 and the repercussions
that they may face if the problem persists. 17 State law may provide
causes of action for bank customers whose personal information is
disclosed.' 8 Also, if the financial industry is unsuccessful in selfregulating its confidentiality policies, federal regulations may be
imposed. 9 However, if financial institutions stop depending upon
common, easily obtainable personal information as their password
protections and if they employ stricter privacy policies, government
regulatory intervention may not be necessary to protect consumers. 20
II. IDENTITY THEFT

A.

Methods of Economic Identity Theft

Banks and other financial institutions are directly involved in
the problem of identity theft. The theft can occur in a variety of ways.
Identity theft can occur by the fraudulent use of existing deposit or
credit accounts. 2' This "account takeover fraud" is perpetrated by
11. See id.
12. See Patrick Leahy, Congress Clears Kyl-Leahy 'Identity Theft' Billfor President's
Signature, PressRelease, Oct. 14, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 19793204.
13. See infra notes 21-53 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 74-135 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 94-135 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 87, 139-41 and accompanying text.
21. See H.R. 4321 - Financial Information Privacy Act: Hearing Before House
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changing the address of an existing credit account." The individual is
unlikely to know of the change until the following billing cycle, if the
account is active, or until the account becomes past due. 23 The
perpetrator can also fraudulently obtain funds by depositing an
uncollectable check and requesting that part of the funds be paid in
cash.24 The identity thief can directly steal funds from an individual's
account by impersonating the individual and effecting a wire transfer,
or by making credit card purchases over the internet or by telephone. 5
The theft can even occur by cashing in an individual's investment
holdings or insurance policies.26
In addition to using existing accounts, identity thieves can
fraudulently open new accounts using an individual victim's personal
information.27 Identity thieves impersonate individual victims and
obtain credit cards and/or finance property, including homes and
automobiles.2 8 Usually, the perpetrator can utilize one person's
identity repeatedly, often without the victim's immediate knowledge.29
Identity thieves are further aided by the fact that current law
does not provide victims of fraud with ready aid from law enforcement
agencies. 3" Current federal laws utilized in criminal prosecutions for
fraud include: the fraudulent use and production of identification
3
31
device fraud, 32 computer fraud,33 wire fraud,34
documents," access
Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. 148-49 (1998) [hereinafter
Privacy Act Hearings] (statement of Boris Melnikoff, Senior Vice President, Wachovia
Corporation).
22. See id. at 148.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 150.
25. See Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 21, at 82 (statement of Robert Douglas).
26. See id. at 86.
27. See Identity Theft Hearings,supra note 3, at 5 (statement of James Bauer, Deputy
Assistant Director, United States Secret Service, Office of Investigations).
28. See id. at 6.
29. See id.

30. See id. at 5.
31. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028 (West Supp.

1998) (pertaining to fraud and related activity in connection with identification
documents).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1029 (West Supp.
1998) (pertaining to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices).

33. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994), amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West Supp.
1998) (pertaining to fraud and related activity in connection with computers).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994) (pertaining to fraud by wire, radio, or television).

322

NORTH CAR OLNA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 3

economic espionage,35 and money laundering.36 These statutes require
an overtly fraudulent act or the creation of a fraudulent document
before law enforcement can get involved.37 The act of stealing a
person's identity in order to commit any of the aforementioned crimes
is not legally sufficient for individual victims to receive assistance and
cooperation from law enforcement.38 It is the fraudulent use of
another person's identity that constitutes the crime. 39 Furthermore,
because the individual whose identity has been misappropriated is not
liable for the thief's debts,40 the current law does not even view the
individual as the victim of the crime. 4 ' Victims of identity theft often
spend thousands of dollars and devote extensive time to restore their
good credit ratings and convince creditors that they themselves
incurred the perpetrator's debts.4n It is also a priority of victims to
have fraud warnings placed on their credit reports so that the
perpetrator is not able to continue using the victim's identity to obtain
further credit.43 However, since the individual is not considered the
actual victim of the crime, victims are left to their own devices to alert
financial institutions, credit reporting agencies and creditors regarding
fraudulent use of their personal information."
B.

Methods of Gaining the Necessary PersonalInformation

Identity thieves are able to commit their crimes through the use
of an individual's personal, and sometimes confidential, information.
This information includes data that banks and other financial
institutions have access to and utilize in the course of their business.
35. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West Supp. 1998) (pertaining to economic espionage).
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994), as amended by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West Supp.
1998) (pertaining to the laundering of monetary instruments).
37. See Identity Theft Hearings, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of James Bauer,
Deputy Assistant Director, United States Secret Service, Office of Investigations).

38. See id.
39. See id.

40. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 1643 (1998) (pertaining to the liability of credit card
holders).
41. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 43-44.

42. See id. at 46-47.
43. See id.
44. See, e.g., Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the Real John
Doe Please Step Forward?,29 MCGEORGE. L. REV. 483, 483-88 (1998) (discussing the
difficulties faced by individual identity theft victims).
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Crucial information for identity thieves includes social security
numbers, maiden names (both of the victim and the victim's mother),
dates of birth, past addresses, and driver's license numbers.4" The
documents on which this information can be found include social
security cards, state driver's licenses, birth certificates, passports, and
voter registration cards and records.46 Methods by which the
information can be obtained include sorting through trash, looking
through a co-worker's desk drawers, stealing mail, soliciting
information through bogus job application or refund distribution
schemes, and investigation on the Internet.47
Another common method of obtaining personal information, as
well as confidential information such as account numbers, is so-called
"pretext calling." This method involves the identity thief, or an
information broker hired by the identity thief, misrepresenting his own
identity in order to obtain personal and/or confidential information
about the victim. 4 This may be done in one of two ways. First, the
caller may identify himself as the individual victim and request
information about that person's financial accounts from banks or other
financial institutions. 49 Armed with personal information such as
someone's name, address, social security number and/or mother's
maiden name, the pretext caller is able to breach most confidentiality
systems employed by a financial institution. A pretext caller may
obtain information such as account balances, account numbers,
payments made or due, and the dates and amounts of recent
transactions. t Second, the caller may identify himself as an employee
45. See Higgins, supra note 1, at 46.
46. See Identity Theft Hearings, supra note 3, at 10 (statement of James Bauer).
47. See id. The Internet includes a wealth of personal information. Perpetrators may
intercept information, such as credit card account numbers. Easily available information

also includes names, phone numbers, and addresses. See, e.g., Switchboard: The Internet
Directory (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.switchboard.com> (providing names,
addresses and phone numbers of individuals); Welcome to WhoWhere?! (visited Jan. 19,
1999) <http://www.whowhere.lycos.com> (providing names, addresses and phone
numbers of individuals); Yahoo! People Search (visited Jan. 19, 1999) <http://www.
people.yahoo.com> (providing names, addresses and phone numbers of individuals).

The danger of having personal information available online must be balanced with benefits

such as locating out-of-touch friends and loved ones.
48. See, e.g., Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 21, at 83 (statement of Robert

Douglas) (discussing methods in which identity thieves obtain an individual's personal
information).

49. See id. at 82.
50. See id. at 85-86.
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of the financial institution when calling the victim. "' In so doing, the
caller may elicit personal or confidential information, including
account numbers and passwords. 2 This gathering of personal
information with the intent of using the information for fraudulent
purposes was not considered a crime; however, newly passed federal
3
legislation has changed that. 1
III.HOUSE BILL 4151 - THE IDENTITY THEFT AND ASSUMPTION
DETERRENCE ACT OF 1998

A.

Purpose of the Act

On October 30, 1998, President Clinton signed into law House
Bill 4151, entitled the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act. 14
This Act is intended to close a gap in federal law that enables identity
thieves to steal funds from financial institutions and to steal the
identities of individuals without pursuit from law enforcement officials
during the early stages of their actions.55 The Identity Theft and
Assumption Deterrence Act (the Act) enables federal law enforcement
officials to initiate an investigation earlier than they otherwise could
since the new law criminalizes the gathering of an individual's
personal identifying information with the intent to perpetrate a fraud. 56
Additionally, the Act is needed to provide individual victims with
some legal path to take.5 7 While some states are taking the initiative in
addressing the problems of identity theft, the problem is nationwide
51. See id. at 82.
52. See id. at 83.
53. See infra notes 54-73 and accompanying text.

54. See Pub. L. No. 105-318, 112 Stat. 3007 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §
1028 (1998)). H.R. 4151 was introduced by Representative John B. Shadegg (R-AZ) on
June 25, 1998. See 144 CONG. REc. H5402 (daily ed. Jun. 25, 1998). The bill was
considered and passed by the House of Representatives on October 7, 1998. See 144
CONG. REc. H9993 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998). Senate Bill 512, 105th Cong. (1998), is a
companion piece to House Bill 4151. Senate Bill 512 was introduced by Senator Jon L.
Kyl (R-AZ) on March 21, 1997. See 144 CONG. REC. S2741 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1997).
Sentate Bill 512 was passed, as amended, by the Senate on July 30, 1998. See 144 CONG.
REC. S9332 (daily ed. Jul. 30, 1998). The Senate considered and passed House Bill 4151
on October 14, 1998. See 144 CONG. REC. S12604 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1998).

55. See Hearings,supra note 3, at 4-7 (statement of James Bauer).
56. See id.
57. See id.

PRIVACY

1999]

and frequently crosses state lines.5 " Victims may live in one state
while the perpetrator acts in another state also defrauding creditors
who may be located in a third state.5 9 The Act addresses this aspect
by making the offense a federal crime, subject to federal enforcement
and federal penalties, thus removing state law jurisdiction
restrictions. "
B.

Contents of the Act

Section 3 of the Act establishes the offense of identity theft. 61
The Act imposes criminal liability for identity theft on one who
"knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful authority, a means of
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or
abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a felony under any
applicable state or local law." 62 "Means of identification" is defined
to include an individual's name, social security number, date of birth,
driver's license or government-issued identificatioii number, taxpayer
identification number, passport number, biometric data, electronic
identification number, address or routing code, or telecommunication
identifying information. 63
The Act provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment of not
more than twenty years and/or a finei 4 The Act also amends the
federal sentencing guidelines to allow the United States Sentencing
Commission to consider such factors as the number of victims and the
extent of their injuries, including harm to reputation and
inconvenience; 65 the number of means of identification, identification
documents or false identification documents utilized67 by the
perpetrator; 66 and the value of the loss caused by the crime.
58. See id. at 1-2 (opening statement of Chairman Jon Kyl).

59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, Pub. L. No. 105-318, §
3, 112 Stat. 3007 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1028 (1998)).

62. Id. at § 3(a)(7).
63. See id. at § 3(d)(3).

64. See id. at § 3(b)(3). This maximum penalty is for violations that were committed
"(A) to facilitate a drug trafficking crime...

(B) in connection with a crime of

violence.., or (C) after a prior conviction under this section becomes final." Id.
65. See id. at § 4(b)(1).
66. See id. at § 4(b)(2).
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Section 5 provides for the enactment of a centralized complaint
and consumer education service for identity theft victims by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).68 No later than one year after the
date of enactment of the Act, the FTC will establish procedures to log
complaints by individuals who reasonably believe themselves to be the
victims of identity theft as defined by the Act.69 Additionally, the FTC
will provide informational materials to those individuals, 70 and will
refer the complaints to the appropriate entities, including, but not
limited to consumer credit reporting agencies and law enforcement
agencies.71
This Act will enable individual victims to contact and receive
help from law enforcement agencies. 7
Such help may include
searches for the perpetrator and may also include the act of filing a
criminal report that will help inform and convince creditors and credit
reporting agencies that a fraud has in fact occurred. The Act will also
make identity theft a crime before the point at which other federal
crimes, such as wire fraud or the fraudulent use and production of
identification documents are committed. 73 Although the act of
gathering the information with the requisite criminal intent is now a
crime, one weakness of the new law is that it does not focus on the
procedures used by perpetrators to gather confidential information.
While the actual crime is technically being committed earlier under the
new law, the methods of gathering confidential information should be
targeted by lawmakers.
IV.ANALYSIS

A

OtherLegislative and Regulatory Measures Currently Under
Consideration
One important piece of legislation addressing the issue of
67. See id. at § 4(b)(3).
68. See id. at § 5.
69. See id.at § 5(a)(1).

70. See id. at § 5(a)(2).
71. See id. at § 5 (a)(3)(A)-(B).
72. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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identity theft is the Financial Information Privacy Act of 1999 (Privacy
Act). This proposed legislation directly affects the role of banks and
other financial institutions in the gathering of confidential information
by identity thieves. The Privacy Act was originally introduced during
the 105th Congress 74 and has been reintroduced by House Banking
Committee Chairman James Leach as House Bill 30. 75 The Privacy
Act specifically targets identity thieves who obtain or attempt to obtain
customer information from financial institutions by false pretenses. 76
The proposed legislation targets pretext callers who contact customers
of financial institutions and make false or fraudulent statements with
the intent to induce the customer into releasing customer information.77

Provisions of the bill specify that law enforcement agencies are exempt
from the act. 78 Additionally, the bill does not prevent any person from
obtaining customer information otherwise available as a public record
filed pursuant to section 3(a)(47) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.79 Certain activities by financial institutions themselves are also
exempt. This legislation does not prevent financial institutions from
obtaining customer information in the course of testing security
systems in place for maintaining confidential customer information,
investigating alleged misconduct or negligence by officers, employees
or agents of the financial institution, or recovering information
obtained or received by another person. 0 Criminal penalties are
provided and those penalties are expressly increased for aggravated
cases.8 ' Civil liability is also imposed upon any person who violates

74. H.R. 4321, 105th Cong. 1998.
75. See H.R. 30, 106th Cong. 1999; R. Christian Bruce, FinancialServices Reform:
Leach Introduces New Version of H.R. 10, Hopes to Regain Momentum from Last Year,
72 Banking Rep. (BNA) 47 (Jan. 11, 1999). A bill that addresses the protection of
consumers' confidential financial information has also been introduced in the Senate. See
Senate Bill 187, 106th Cong. 1999; Paul Sarbanes, Senators Seek to Protect Consumers
Confidential FinancialInformation, Press Release, Jan. 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL
2221911.
76. See R. Christian Bruce, Privacy Bill Clears House Banking Panel With
Amendments Allowing Court Action, 71 Banking Rep. (BNA) 256 (Aug. 10, 1998).

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See H.R. 30, 106th Cong. § 1003(a)(2) (1999).
See id. at § 1003(c).
See id. at § 1003(e).
See id. at § 1003(d).
See id. at § 1006. The circumstances in which the increased penalties apply are

based upon violations of this act in accordance with violations of other law involving more

than $100,000 in a twelve-month period. See id.
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the Privacy Act; however, financial institutions are expressly excluded
from liability and are entitled to recover damages and attorney's fees
from those who violate the Privacy Act.82
The Privacy Act does not address all methods in which pretext
callers and identity thieves obtain confidential consumer information,
but makes some of the more common methods illegal. The bill strikes
some balance between the privacy interests of consumers and the
legitimate uses of pretext calling because the legislation does not
prohibit the use of pretext calling by law enforcement agencies.
Chairman Leach described the bill as "both pro-consumer and proprivacy... [and as] respond[ing] to an urgent threat to the integrity
of financial institutions themselves." 83 The American Bankers
Association has announced that it supports the legislation but opposes
any efforts to codify industry guidelines on privacy, choosing instead
to continue with self-regulation in the privacy area. 84
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
regulator of national banks, has issued statements in regard to the
problem of privacy and pretext calling. Amidst self-regulatory efforts
to protect the privacy of confidential consumer information, Acting
Comptroller Julie L. Williams has called upon the banking industry to
demonstrate leadership in the protection of customer privacy." The
OCC has warned the banking industry of the dangers of information
brokers and the method of pretext calling as a means of obtaining
information from financial institutions. 8 6 The OCC suggests that the
use of two common personal identifiers, social security numbers and
mothers'maiden names, should be avoided in favor of more
sophisticated passwords less easily obtained. 87 The OCC also suggests
82. See id at § 1005. Actual damages would equal the greater of the actual damages

incurred by the customer or by the financial institution as a result of the violation or any
amount received by the perpetrator. See id. at § 1005(l).
83. James A. Leach, House Banking Committee Approves Privacy Bill, Press Release,
Aug. 5, 1998, availablein 1998 WL 7326130 (referring to H.R. 4321).
84. See R. Christian Bruce, Privacy Bill Clears House Banking Panel With
Amendments Allowing Court Action, 71 Banking Rep. (BNA) 257 (Aug. 10, 1998).
85. See OCC News Release 98-50, Acting Comptroller Julie L. Williams Urges
Industry Leadership on Consumer Privacy (May 8, 1998) (remarks of Julie L. Williams
before the Banking Roundtable Lawyers Counsel).

86. See OCC News Release 98-86, OCC Warns Banks About Pretext Calling by
Information Brokers (Aug. 20, 1998).
87. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Banks Told to Boost Data Safeguards; Regulators Call
Procedures on Customer Information Inadequate to Curb Internet Abuses, WASH. POST,
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that banks routinely check their security systems, possibly even by
hiring their own pretext callers as a test. "
ProtectiveMeasures Available to FinancialInstitutions

B.

The standard of what constitutes reasonable protection by
financial institutions is evolving. This evolution is due in part to
New fraud prevention methods feature
technological advances.
biometrics, including fingerprinting, iris scanning, and voice or face
recognition. 9 While many of these methods are still too costprohibitive to be effective on a large scale, fingerprinting is currently
being utilized by some financial institutions with some success.
Individuals who wish to cash a check at a bank with which they do not
have an account may be required to provide a thumbprint. The benefit
of fingerprinting in combating check fraud is two-fold. First, it serves
as a deterrent for those who would otherwise have committed fraud
but are hesitant to provide incriminating evidence. Second, for those
who do provide a fingerprint, law enforcement has useful physical
evidence from the start of an investigation. 90 One 1996 study showed
a 47 % year-to-date reduction in check fraud losses. 9
In addition to the economic losses that can be prevented by
utilizing stronger privacy protections, financial institutions will also
benefit from less government regulation and greater freedom for
industry self-regulation. 92 Without adequate privacy protections,
Aug. 21, 1998, at G1.

88. See id.
89. See, e.g., Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 21, at 151(statement of Boris
Melnikoft) (discussing new technologies and techniques that may aid in fraud prevention).
For a discussicn of biometrics, see generally John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning,
Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns-Draftingthe Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PITT. L.
REV. 97 (1997) (exploring biometrics and biometric applications as well as the associated
legal and policy issues); David A. Petti, An Argument for the Implementation of a
Biometric Authentication System ("BAS"), 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 703

(1998).
90. See Privacy Act Hearings, supra note 21, at 151 (statement of Boris Melnikoff).
91. See id. (citing a 1996 study by the Clearing House Association of the Southwest
of the effect on check fraud losses following implementation of practices fingerprinting
non-customers cashing checks at financial institutions).

92. See Julie L. Williams, Remarks by Julie L. Williams Acting Comptroller of the
Currency before the ConsumerBankers Association, Aventura, Florida(October 26, 1998)
Ms.
(visited Jan. 26, 1999) <http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/98-109a.txt>.
Williams refers to "the ability [fof financial institutions] to shape their own policies and
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government regulations will likely be imposed, thus minimizing the
industry's ability to impose and enforce its own policies.93 Another
benefit of stronger privacy protections is that they may reduce the
bank's potential liability to customers under state law causes of action
relating to disclosures of personal and/or confidential information.
Causes of Action Available to Individual Victims

C.

Existing state law may provide causes of action for customers
against financial institutions for releasing confidential information to
third parties. These causes of action may be grounded in tort, such as
negligence or an invasion of privacy, or they may be grounded in
contract, such as breach of an implied contract. Plaintiffs may also
utilize specific state statutes.
The factual contexts of the following cases typically do not
involve identity theft. However, the following cases address available
legal recourses for customers of financial institutions whose employees
have disclosed personal and/or confidential information in other
contexts. Often, the disclosure was made to law enforcement officials;
however, the holdings may be extended to apply to the situation of
identity theft since courts have addressed that issue in terms of
permissible disclosures to third parties and in terms of duties owed by
banks to their customers. The following cases provide some examples
of how state courts have treated customers' causes of actions and give
an indication of how courts may react to cases pertaining to identity
theft.

94

avoid being subject to the one-size-fits-all approach that might be mandated under the
law" as a benefit of self-regulation. Id.
93. See id.
94. See Thomas C. Russler and Steven H. Epstein, Disclosure of Customer
Information to Third Parties: When is the Bank Liable?, 111 BANKING L.J. 258 (1994)
(examining the case law interpreting the legal duties of banks); Roy Elbert Huhs, Jr., To
Disclose or not to Disclose Customer Records, 108 BANKING L.J. 30 (1991) (discussing
banks' conflicting duties of maintaining the confidentiality of customer records and the
duty to disclose those records under special circumstances); THOMAS P. VARTANIAN ET
AL., 21ST CENTURY MONEY, BANKING & COMMERCE § 12.03, at 297-99 (1998)
(addressing a bank's duty of confidentiality in light of the problem of identity theft). See
generally Cheryl B. Preston, Honor Among Bankers: Ethics in the Exchange of
Commercial Credit Information and the Protection of Customer Interests, 40 KAN. L.
REV. 943 (1992) (addressing the exchange of commercial credit information, the effect on
the interests of customers in accuracy, privacy, and fairness, and the insufficiencies of
self-regulation).
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In Suburban Trust Company v. Waller,95 the plaintiff sought to
cash an income tax refund check approximately one month after
opening an account. 96

When the bank refused to cash the check

because the plaintiff did not have enough money in his account to
cover the check, the plaintiff instead went to the United States
Treasury Department in Washington, D.C. and cashed the check
there.97 Plaintiff returned to his bank and deposited $800 in fifty and
one hundred dollar bills, numbered sequentially." The teller found
this suspicious, and bank personnel proceeded to inform the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the Montgomery County Police
Department.99 An assistant security officer for the bank provided the
police with plaintiff's name, address, physical description,
employment, and deposit information, as well as bank surveillance
photographs.'
This disclosure led to the identification of plaintiff by
the victim of a local residential robbery, and the plaintiff was
arrested. 01 ' After the victim retracted the identification, the charges
against the plaintiff were dropped.102
Plaintiff filed suit against the bank alleging an invasion of
privacy and a breach of implied contract.'0 3 The court of appeals
affirmed the lower court's ruling as to the bank's liability for wrongful
disclosure.'' The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland stated that:
We think that a bank depositor in this State has a right
to expect that the bank will, to the extent permitted by
law, treat as confidential, all information regarding his
account and any transaction relating thereto.
Accordingly, we hold that, absent compulsion by law,
a bank may not make any disclosures concerning a
depositor's account without the express or implied
95. 408 A.2d 758 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
96. See id. at 760.
97. See id.

98. See id.
99. See id. at 761.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.

104. See id. at 765-66. The trial judge directed a verdict for the plaintiff. See id.
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consent of the depositor. 105
This standard arguably enables customers to bring an action
against their financial institution for unauthorized disclosure of
personal information. The issue of consent may hinge on the
institution's policies regarding the confidentiality of customer
information.
In Indiana National Bank v. Chapman,' 6 a bank loan officer
disclosed information to a state police officer regarding the plaintiff's
automobile loan payments.' 0 7 Plaintiff's car had been reported stolen
and was later found in a burned-out condition. 0 8 Based in part on
information provided by the loan officer that the plaintiff had missed a
monthly payment, plaintiff was charged with fourth degree arson." 9
During trial, the prosecution moved for dismissal of the charge
following testimony that it believed indicated a different account of
plaintiff's payment history. 0
Plaintiff filed suit against the bank alleging invasion of
privacy, slander, breach of implied contract, and negligence."' The
Court of Appeals of Indiana held that a legitimate inquiry by law
enforcement could not give rise to a private cause of action for
invasion of privacy.112 In support of this ruling, the court cited United
States v. Miller 1 3 in which the United States Supreme Court reversed
a lower court ruling finding that bank records, such as checks and
deposit slips, were "the business records of the bank and not the
private papers of the respondent" 114 and therefore not within a "zone
of privacy." ' 15 The court of appeals then ruled in favor of the bank as
to the slander allegation because the bank had a qualified privilege
105. Id. at 764.
106. 482 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. 1985).
107. See id. at 475-76.

108. See id. at 476.
109. See id.

110. See id. at 477.
111. See id. at 476.
112. See id., at 478.
113. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
114. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 482 N.E.2d at 478.
115. See id. The Court in Miller held that such information is voluntarily conveyed to
the bank by the customer so that the customer could have no legitimate expectation of

privacy. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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regarding communications made in good faith pursuant to a legitimate
law enforcement investigation. 116 Additionally,
the court found no
1 17
evidence of malice on the part of the bank.
In addressing plaintiff's claim that the bank breached an
implied contract, the court held that a bank has an implied contract
with customers not to disclose certain financial information.11 8 The
court acknowledged exceptions to this general principle, but limited
those exceptions to situations in which a public duty has arisen." 9
This public duty test is satisfied if disclosures are made in conjunction
with a legitimate law enforcement investigation. 120 In ruling on
plaintiff's negligence action, the court found that there was no
evidence supporting a breach of the bank's duty not to disclose
customer information to someone who does not have a compelling
public interest.12 Again, the court acknowledged that duties are owed
by financial institutions to their customers regarding account
information, and again the court limited the exceptions to those duties.
Therefore, in cases of identity theft and pretext calling, financial
institutions may be exposed to liabilities for disclosures to someone
who does not have a public interest in the information.
In Milohnich v. First National Bank of Miami Springs, 22 the
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for the disclosure of
confidential information to third parties that resulted in legal actions
against the plaintiff by the third parties. The District Court of Appeal
of Florida addressed whether or not the bank breached an implied
contractual duty to the plaintiff to keep the plaintiff's personal
information confidential. 23 The court relied on two earlier cases to
arrive at a decision that acknowledged that banks have a duty to
depositors to keep account information confidential and not to divulge
such information to third parties.1 24 The Florida Supreme Court
116. See IndianaNat'l Bank, 482 N.E.2d at 479-80 (citing Conn v. PaulHarrisStores,
439 N.E.2d 195, 200 (Ind. 1982); Zakas v. Mills, 251 S.E.2d 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978)).
117. See id. at 480.

118. See id.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See id. at 480-82.
See id. at 482.
See id. at 482-84.
224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).

123. See id. at 760.
124. See id. at 760-62. The court made note of Tournier v. National Provincial &
Union Bank, 1 K.B. 461 (1924), a leading English case which held that terms that were
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modified the Milohnich ruling in Barnett Bank of West Florida v.
Hooper.25 The Hooper court limited the Milohnich holding to
depositors (thus excluding loan holders) and provided for four
circumstances in which disclosure was permissible. 26 The court added
27
that other circumstances may allow for disclosure. 1
One case that directly involves identity theft is Andrews v.
1 2
Trans Union Corporation.
1 In this case, the plaintiff was suing two
credit reporting agencies in connection with their release of credit
reports in response to an identity thief's credit application, and also in
connection with the inclusion in the plaintiff's credit report of
information regarding an imposter's credit activities. 129 The action
was brought under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,' 30 and it focused in
part on issues of the accuracy of the credit reports and the
permissibility of providing the plaintiff's credit reports.'
While the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
permissibility claim, the court denied summary judgment as to issues
of accuracy and the failure to correct inaccurate information. 132
State law actions may be brought by the states themselves.
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal has announced that
his office is investigating information brokers in connection with
necessarily in the contemplation of the parties making a contract will be implied by the

court, and that it is implied that a bank will not disclose account information except in
certain circumstances. See Milohnich, 224 So. 2d at 760-61. The court noted that
Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961) comported
with the Tournier court's holding that a bank has an implied duty not to disclose a
depositor's account information unless authorized by law or by the depositor. See
Milohnich, 224 So. 2d at 760.
125. 498 So. 2d 923, 924-25 (Fla. 1986).

126. See id. at 925. The four circumstances are: (1) under compulsion of law; (2)
pursuant to a public interest; (3) pursuant to the bank's interests; or (4) when made with

the expressed or implied consent of the customer. See id.
127. See id. In this particular case, the additional "special circumstance" under which

a bank may disclose the account information of a depositor was when the bank had actual
knowledge of a fraud that was being perpetrated on a customer by another bank customer.
See id. In Hooper, the customer brought action because the bank failed to disclose the

fraud. See id. at 924.
128. 7 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
129. See id. at 1063-65.
130. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West Supp. 1998). See, e.g., Albert S. Jacquez & Amy S.

Friend, The Fair Credit Reporting Act: Is it Fairfor Consumers?, 5 LoY. CONSUMER L.
REP. 81 (1993) (summarizing the FCRA and the legislative purpose for its enactment).
131. See Andrews, 7 F. Supp. 2d at 1060.

132. See id. at 1084.
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possible privacy violations.' 33 He also said that there are plans to
subpoena as many as six banks operating in Connecticut. 3' Those
banks may face some responsibility for privacy violations. 3 '
As these cases illustrate, customers of financial institutions
face obstacles in bringing actions for the improper release of
confidential information. However, courts have allowed these suits in
many cases and plaintiffs have found success. While banks that
divulge customer information enjoy some liability protection, the
implied contractual right of nondisclosure suggests that stricter
security measures be implemented by financial institutions for the
protection of their customers. In light of available technology and the
relative ease with which identity thieves can obtain personal
information, customers will expect financial institutions to execute
more rigid security schemes.
V. CONCLUSION

Identity theft is a widespread, national problem. 136 The
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 is an important
first step in addressing the problem and trying to aid all victims of
identity theft. 137 However, the act does not address any of the specific
means by which information is being misappropriated.' 38 Legislation
may help solve that aspect of identity theft, but financial institutions
themselves can also do much to prevent unwarranted disclosures of
customer information.1 39 Possible strategies that financial institutions
may utilize include no longer using traditional passwords such as
social security numbers or mothers' maiden names and/or employing
biometric techniques to prevent impersonation by identity thieves or
pretext callers. 140 The benefits of employing these techniques include
lower economic losses due to fraud, the avoidance of additional layers
133. See Jon G. Auerbach et al., Prying Eyes: With These Operators, Your Bank
Account Is Now an Open Book, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1998, at Al.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See supra notes 1-12, 21-53 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 53-73 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 74-83 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
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of federal regulation, and a minimization of state law actions by
customers.'
One additional potential benefit is a happier customer
base. One customer whose account information had been disclosed to
a pretext caller said that he is considering changing banks because of a
lack of security in the bank that divulged his account balances to an
information broker. 142 That may provide the greatest motivation for
financial institutions to prevent unauthorized disclosures and to tighten
existing security practices.
KRISTEN S. PROVENZA

141. See supra notes 90-135 and accompanying text.
142. See Auerbach et al., supra note 133, at A13.

